Danish Senior Officers´ Experiences from IFOR/SFOR, Bosnia 1996-1999

DANISH SENIOR OFFICERS’´ EXPERIENCES FROM IFOR/SFOR, BOSNIA 1996 - 1999 Henning Sørensen Abstract This article is part of a larger study comparing tensions between cooperating armed forces of 16 countries serving in Bosnia in IFOR/SFOR in1996 - 1999. For the Danish contingent the study was confined to the military top level, due to the simple fact that here relations between military personnel from other countries are more common than in the lower echelons. Tensions in the Danish study were pursuit at four levels: a. In the Danish battalion in Bosnia (including soldiers from Baltic countries working with Danish soldiers and living in the Danish Camps), b. Military-to-Military relations, i.e. at the division level (towards the Americans), at the Brigade level (the Nordic Polish Brigade), c. Military-to-International (political and humanitarian, i.e. non-military) Organizations including the NGOs. d. Military-to-Local Civilians, i.e. towards local authorities and the local population Tensions were neither found at the internal military area within DANBN, nor at the “military-to-international” political level (toward the international political organizations or toward the local population.) Some tensions were identified toward NGOs, the national external military logistic supplying unit DLR, the multinational external military unit NORD POL BDE, and local authorities. Major tensions existed toward the US Army, created by the Americans’ military values, rules of command and control, and in particular, daily work relations. Here, improvements in the behavior of the US Army for the sake of its IFOR/SFOR partners and their mutual cause are called for. The study moreover shows that today, the job of a soldier has become less violent, more varied, with the participation of more nations, for new reasons, and characterized by faster intervention. Politically, soldiers play a more active and exposed role in society than they once did because they are perceived as ambassadors for their country when deployed abroad and because their decisions may have foreign political content and consequences. Economically, the armed forces are now paid as much for their performance in low-level conflicts and humanitarian missions than they are for national defense operations. Actually, many Western European armed forces receive heavy weaponry and air/sea lift material more easily for their interventions in humanitarian missions than they do for traditional national defense missions. Militarily, Western armed forces cannot rely on combat merits only, but have to reconcile contrasting objectives: alleviation and violence, international and national presence, military and humanitarian objectives, speedy intervention and deliberate non-commitment. All this demonstrates the expansion of Western military functions. The old discussion of “guns-versus-butter” is now a “butter-for-guns” debate. Background* 1.1Danish Military Experience in PSOs Denmark has increased her participation in multinational military missions abroad since the end of the Cold War even if her strong UN commitment has been a fact for half a century. Since 1948, 50,000 Danish soldiers have taken part in about half of all UN military missions around the world, but mostly as UN military observers. The present Danish military engagement abroad can be documented by the number of soldiers deployed in UN-, NATO-, EU-, or OSCE-missions for more than three months. From April 1992 to December 1997, 3,902 soldiers from the Army, 572 from the Navy, and 214 from the Air Force have served abroad. Divided into personnel categories it is 715 officers, 1,059 enlisted men/NCOs, and 2,128 conscripts. Therefore, 35% of all Army officers, 44% of the NCOs, and 7 % of all conscripts have been deployed. For the Navy, the participation rate is respectively 10%, 12%, and 13%; for the Air Force, the participation rate is even lower 7%, 6%, and 3%. Research Methods and Main Focus The data here presented of the experiences of the Danish Army in IFOR/SFOR missions in Bosnia from January 1996 and up to the present is based on four sources. First, from February to July 1999, I conducted in-depth, face-to-face interviews with 30 senior officers, (i.e., lieutenant colonels [LTCs] to - brigadier generals), out of a total of 33 Danish senior officers having served there. The 30 Danish senior officers interviewed for this study normally served for six months (from January/February 1996 to July/August 1999) and were deployed as follows: 6 in the National Logistic Support Unit (NSE)/Nordic Support Group (NSG), 11 in the Danish Battalion (DANBN), 10 in NORD POL BDE, and 6 in 12 NATO nations “Ace Rapid Reaction Corps” (ARRC) in Sarajevo, or the US Army-dominated Multinational Division (North) in Tuzla, MND(N). The total number of senior officers here reaches 33, but three officers had double functions in either NSE/NORD POL BDE or in NORD POL BDE/MND(N). Their profile is as follows:  Rank: 19 were LTCs, 10 colonels (COLs), and 1 was a brigadier general.  Age at time of deployment: 3 were 40 years old or below; 10 were between 41-45; 8 were between 46-50; 7 were between 51-55; and 2 were over 55.  Occupational responsibility: 57% “staff,” 53% “operations,” 23% “logistics,” and 7% CIMIC. Here again, several officers stated that they had served in two or more main occupational areas.  Multinational military peace supporting experience: 53% had no experience at all, while 23% had less than one year; only 23% had more than one year. It must, however, be remembered that the deployment of that many, relatively spoken, Danish soldiers to Bosnia is a new phenomenon, so an increasing Danish participation rate for officers is unavoidable. Second, I used information from and interviews with soldiers during my last visit in March 1999 to the two Danish camps, Valhalla and Dannevirke, which house the Danish battalion in Bosnia. Third, my research included an investigation of Danish literature on Danish UNPROFOR- and IFOR/SFOR-participation: Regimental leaflets, “FOV-nyhedsbrev,” the “UNPROFOR-DANBAT” books, seven the seven contingents’ “End of Tour Reports” for the Danish IFOR/SFOR missions, Danish Defense data on the internet, newspaper articles, official reports, and scientific civil and military material. Finally, I included information from the debriefing on 26 February 1999 of the SFOR Tour 7, where all officers, having just ended their turn in Bosnia, met with officers and civilians who were responsible for the ammunition, gear, and personnel sent them from Denmark. The main aim of this project has concentrated on observing the multinational cooperation between contingents sent to Bosnia, which are different in many aspects. They come from a great number of countries, with different political and military cultures. These different cultures influence the behavior and ways of doing business, which can lead to tensions in practical cooperation on the ground in multinational military deployments. 2. Internal Military Dimension 2.1 The Danish Defense Structure in Bosnia The size of the local Danish force in IFOR/SFOR missions in Bosnia/Hungary from 1996 to 1999 amounts to 850 soldiers mainly distributed on three different military organizations:  40 - 15 soldiers in NSE/NSG in Pecs, Hungary, gradually reduced since 1996  545 soldiers in the DANBN in Bosnia  253 soldiers in the NORD POL BDE, inclusive headquarters company, and 10 MP soldiers A few Danish officers have been assigned to MND(N), the American division “Task Force Eagle” in Tuzla, or to the ARRC in Sarajevo responsible for the implementation of IFOR/SFOR. The selection of Danish soldiers is - as said - a mix: 63% are former self-selected conscripts having signed a contract with the Danish Reaction Brigade (DIB), while the 37% who are professionals were ordered to do so. In contrast, all Norwegian officers and soldiers are volunteers. DANBN is placed near Doboj in Bosnia and divided into two camps: Valhalla (in Muslim territory) and Dannevirke (Serbian territory), making Denmark one of the few peacekeeper nations with a garrison on both sides; the Netherlands is another. The DANBN mission area is 530 square kilometers, including a 150 km. long and 4 km. wide Zone of Separation (ZOS). DANBN, together with battalions from Finland, Norway, Poland, and Sweden, forms the Nordic Polish Brigade (NORD POL BDE), bringing the number of soldiers up to 5,000. NORD POL BDE is then part of MND(N), headed by the US Army, including three other brigades from Turkey, Russia, and the USA. The latter, however, with its staff, are directly placed within that of the MND(N). Some observations shall be made with respect to the local Danish force structure in Bosnia. First, both in the battalion and in NORD POL BDE, the multinational element is evident. Approximately 100 US soldiers from a reduced artillery company and a radar unit (now only the radar unit is still in place) were deployed in the Danish battalion. In addition, military contingents from all three Baltic nations served in DANBN. On top of that, interpreters from all three ethnic groups (Croats, Serbs, and Muslims) work for and, in some cases, even live in the Camp. In NORD POL BDE, the multinational component is even more visible with 9 nations: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, (Poland, the USA, and the three ethnic groups working together. Second, both the staffs of DANBN and NORD POL BDE are bigger than normal. In Denmark, a normal battalion has 10 staff-officers, in Bosnia DANBN has 25 officers as it has more functions to attend, i.e., civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and logistics. In the same way although a normal brigade that in Denmark would have had 25 officers, in Bosnia, the NORD POL BDE has had between 63 and 115 officers. Third, in the MND(N) staff, the US presence was significant, as 98% were US soldiers. Therefore, by staff representation, number of soldiers, and equipment, the US Army dominates. 2.2 The Danish Military Relations in Bosnia Today´s changed combat situation, characterized by local combat between neighbors, occasionally fighting each other , sometimes using unorthodox weapons, causing outrageous violence against one another, and denying Western military “rules of the game” do, of course, influence the work of Western soldiers deployed into such combat areas. The extent to which Danish senior officers envisage points of tensions within their own military unit in Bosnia will now be pursued by focusing on their motivation, time consumption, risk environment, and role perception. 2.2.1 Motivation Danish senior officers are not that motivated to ask for deployment abroad. They are ordered to go and left with only two answers, either “Yes, Sir” or “Thank you, Sir.” For that reason motives such as “higher salary” and “avoiding unemployment” are excluded. However, the study shows not only the kind of motives but even their intensity by asking: “How important are the following motives for your serving in IFOR/SFOR missions?” at 3 levels: “Very,” “Somewhat,” and “Less/unimportant.” Here, only the “very” important motives are represented: “Gain additional kills for the future” was chosen by 60% of all officers; “Practice my military skills” by 57%; “See if I can accomplish my tasks” 50%; “Contribute to world peace” 43%; “Other” and “Experience something exciting” got 33% each; while “Improve career possibilities,” “Interest in the Balkans,” “Get to know a foreign country,” and “Prove myself in dangerous situations” all got support from 10% or less of the Danish senior officers. So the motives for Danish senior officers are professionally oriented (i.e., “skills/task”), whereas ideological motives (“Contribute to world peace”) and personal ones (“Prove myself,” “Interest in the Balkans,” “Get to know a foreign country”) play a minor role. Here, the professional Danish senior officers distinguish themselves from former Danish conscripts, where 38% argue for joining the DIB “to get exciting experiences” as the most often mentioned motive. A difference in motivations between officers and regulars could indicate some tensions, however this is not the case. First, in civil and military hierarchies, in general, management and employees have different motives. Second, studies of regimental leaflets searching for comments of dissatisfaction of regulars during this period give no such evidence. Third, the professional motives do not exclude personal enthusiasm and even gratitude having served for 6 months in IFOR/SFOR missions in Bosnia. Many Danish senior officers defined it the best experience of their entire military career working closely together with their soldiers for a good cause. 2.2.2 Time consumption The Danish senior officers were asked: “Distribute your actual time consumption (100%) in IFOR/SFOR” with the options: “Internal military,” “external military,” and “local politics.” Having calculated their combined spending within each of the three areas, the 30 Danish officers spent 56% on internal military issues, i.e., within his own military organization such as the National Logistics Support Unit (NSE), DANBN, NORD POL BDE, or MND(N)/ARRC, 33% on external military, i.e., other military organizations within the IFOR/FOR Army, and 10% on local politics even if big differences from one officer to another are perceived. Of course, more reservations ought here to be made: planning of operations/patrolling in mission area is calculated as internal military but might as well be characterized as local politics; many staff officers are by definition mostly engaged in “internal military” issues; over their 6 months of service, many officers experienced a shift from “internal military” time consumption toward more “external” and “local” time spending because they, in the beginning, had to focus on their own soldiers to make them “fit to fight” outside the garrison; finally, more senior officers told that the modest results from negotiations with local authorities made them reduce the time they spent on them. The time consumption of Danish senior officers in Bosnia (with 56% on internal military, 33% on external military, and 10% on local politics) is rather different from that of Danish Army senior officers in Denmark, who, in 1983, used 83% of their time on internal military issues (i.e., subordinates, conscripts, and close superiors), 12% on external military (i.e., other commands and services), and only 5% on politicians, media, officers’ trade unions, etc. In short, the reduced time spent on internal military issues in Bosnia is instead used on other military contingents. This change gives only minor tensions. First, 83% of all Danish senior officers were content with the actual distribution of time on the three areas: internal and external military and local politics. Second, in spite of the combat scenario in Bosnia, Danish senior officers use the majority of their time on their own military forces, which is business as usual in Denmark. This was highly appropriate in the initial phase of the implementation of DANBN/IFOR in Bosnia beginning in January 1996 and in the first month after deployment. Third, the increased external time consumption has been used on other IFOR/ SFOR military contingents not on local authorities or population. This indicates a tension, as only 10% of Danish senior officers’ time is spent on local politics, even if “local authorities and local population have caused Danish officers considerable problems” and even though they were actually the reason for their deployment abroad. If Danish senior officers did want to increase their local contacts, however, they could easily do so just by arranging more meetings with local authorities or more patrolling around in the area. So, time consumption in itself gives no tension even if relations between Danish senior officers and local authorities could be problematic as shown below in part 5, below. 2.2.3 Risk Environment The dangerous environment for IFOR/SFOR soldiers, NGOs, and locals was tested by asking: “To what extent have you reported about the following incidents/problems during your tour of duty?” The officers were provided with three options: “Often” (i.e., 6 times or more during the service period of six months), “Sometimes” (i.e., between 2- 6 times), and “Seldom/never” (i.e., 0-1 time). The formulation “reported,” meaning that the senior officer himself has written about it, excludes hearsay information. The seriousness of incidents is divided into three categories: Death/injury, dangerous situations, and problems for the same three groups (soldiers, NGOs, and locals), such as “harassment,” “involvement in conflicts,” and “conflicts.” Only 7 Danish senior officers have reported the “death or injury of [an] IFOR/SFOR soldier, NGOs, local citizen;”, 13 officers reported “dangerous situations for [an] IFOR/SFOR soldier, NGOs, local citizen;” and 15 officers reported “conflicts with local population,” while 10 officers did not report any incident. So, by and large the risk environment in the Danish mission area in Bosnia is/has been low. In the beginning of the IFOR/SFOR mission, however, casualties were rather high. In the first period, from January to August 1996, the deaths of four IFOR soldiers were reported in the mission area, and in February 1996, 15 local citizens from Doboj were killed by mine explosions. In the same period, monthly reports of mine explosions killing locals, of confrontations between locals, and of their disarmament were issued. For instance, 500 Muslims and 1,500 Serbs aggressively stood against one another at Bridge Zulu 09 connecting Serb and Federation (Muslim and Croat) territory. From August 1996 to February 1997, reports of two dead IFOR soldiers were made, a Danish tank was overturned, and Bridge Zulu 09 was damaged by a bomb. But casualties did drop over time. From February to August 1997, no casualties were reported, even though a Danish tank was ambushed and then attacked by Molotov cocktails and even though NATO decided on August 9, 1997 to disarm the Serbian special police force for having acted violently toward its own population, an action implemented on November 10, 1997. In the greater NORD POL BDE mission area, casualties were, of course, higher, including suicides among US soldiers from February 1997, and, in the period from February to August 1998, two Polish soldiers were killed when hitting a mine. In general, however, the risk environment for Danish soldiers was low and tensions in the IFOR period faded away over time. 2.2.4 Role Perception The role perception of Danish senior officers was tested by asking them to “characterize the four most important roles in your military organization (DANBN, NORD POL BDE, MND(N), ARRC, HQ IFOR Army)” with 8 options: “professional soldier, citizen soldier, mediator, ambassador, humanitarian worker, social worker, other.” All Danish officers answered “Professional soldier,” 80% mentioned “mediator and ambassador,” and 53% “humanitarian worker.” This distribution can explain the lack of tension for a number of reasons. Danish senior officers have a very broad role perception, ranging from professional soldier to “humanitarian worker.” The inclusion of the role of “humanitarian worker” among the four most important roles is not only new, (a decade ago, no Danish senior officers would ever have dreamed of that self-identification), but is also extremely necessary in PSOs, as Danish soldiers are used to reestablish water facilities, gas-pipe-lines, and electricity, assist in local/regional elections, monitor the local population living in or visiting (former) hostile territories, distribute aid, etc. This civil-military cooperation, CIMIC, is highly valued as the increased contact with locals can improve the force protection of Danish Soldiers. As described above, tensions between Danish soldiers in DANBN are at a minimum and the general atmosphere seems good. This is confirmed by the regimental leaflets, in which regulars, NCOs, and officers describe their time and service in Bosnia; hardly any criticism is brought forward. On the other hand, examples of “individual tensions” can be found by looking into the number of repatriated soldiers. For tour 6 August 1998-February 1999, only 23 of 900 soldiers have been repatriated and 52 sanctioned. Still one could argue that any such figure is one too much. But they are comparably low, and do even include officers having been repatriated. One reason for the low rate of sanctions/tensions could be a humane personnel policy, a liberal attitude toward alcohol, acceptance of homosexuality, many welfare arrangements, more free trips to Denmark and elsewhere, including those given to stressed and overworked soldiers to the lively Pecs, Hungary (location of the Danish NSE), to recover, etc. Actually, recreation trips for tour seven include 9 welfare tours for 350 soldiers around Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungaryd 900 free trips back home, and 150 trips elsewhere. To conclude, Danish senior officers have a clear and positive attitude to the PSO in Bosnia and, for that and other reasons, little tension is found to be caused by internal military factors. For example, Danish senior officers are professionally, and not personally, motivated to serve down there. These officers spend the majority of their time on their own soldiers to improve their effectiveness (much as they would at home in Denmark.) The risk environment in this PSO is currently low, and the officers’ role perception is broad, including both professional and humanitarian roles. They are confident about their own performance and the lack of tension and of relative deprivation within the Danish contingent; the regimental leaflets confirm this perception. This is not to say that everything within the Danish armed forces in Bosnia is, and in particular was, just fine. Actually, in the UNPROFOR mission from 1992 to 1995, Danish soldiers criticized their country’s compliant character and the lack of education/material within the Danish Army. Nevertheless, as a bottom line, Danish soldiers in DANBN on the IFOR/SFOR mission serve at all levels and within all branches without encountering or engendering much tension. 3. Military to Military Relations After having analyzed “internal” military issues, Danish senior officers’ external relations toward other military contingents are now focused on by asking three questions: -“Please rate the extent to which you have been in professional contact with the following political/ military/humanitarian authorities.” -“Please identify where you personally consider improvements absolutely necessary to facilitate your work.” -“Please rate the extent to which you have had professional problems with the same political/military/humanitarian authorities.” As seen from the formulations, the external relations of Danish senior officers included not only other military actors, but also 19 different international, national and local organizations with different military/political/humanitarian tasks: • International organizations: Peace Implementation Council (PIC), NATO (SHAPE), OSCE Office of the High Representative (OHR), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Missions in Bosnia-Herzogovina(UNMIBH) • Danish organizations: Defense Ministry (MoD), Danish Defense Command (DC), Army Operational Command (HOK), “Danske Livregiment” (DLR - the regiment responsible for supporting DANBN), National Logistic Support Unit (NSE) , DANBN • Local organizations: NORD POL BDE, MND(N), Red Cross (or other NGOs) The results show that Danish soldiers in Bosnia/Hungary are mainly in contact with four local and three national organizations, all with military tasks:  Local organizations: MND(N) staff of the American Division “Task Force Eagle” in Tuzla, Bosnia, NORD POL BDE in Doboj, Bosnia and in NSG in Pecs, Hungary, Baltic military units in DANBN,  Danish military units: HOK, DLR serving DANBN and NORD POL BDE from Denmark, of which a few were identified as problematic, cfr. table 1. Table 1 in about here Table 1 shows that NORD POL BDE is the key contact unit for 87% of Danish senior officers followed by DANBN by 77%, and, as third, HOK by 40%. When asked to evaluate other military organizations and identify which unit caused most working tensions, the US Army-headed MND(N) was “the one,” identified by almost half of all Danish senior officers as the most problematic, followed by DLR by around one third; NORD POL BDE was judged by around one fourth of the officers to be in the third place. We shall go behind the figures for the four most contacted military authorities and try to explain the criticism by distinguishing between three different reasons for tensions:  National values and organizational principles  Rules of command and control  Daily working relations. 3.1 Multinational Division (North) Tensions in multinational/international staffs consisting of “1,600 US Army soldiers, four Danish, and some twenty other European soldiers, a great (but to me unknown) number of locals, and one single Canadian Captain” are to be expected. So, it may be interesting to study what their causes are. We will start with differences in military values and organizations. 3.1.1 Military Values and Organizational Principles Danish senior officers were asked: “Please describe the concept of ‘good military leadership.’” They did so by referring to civil factors and relations to soldiers such as “get results, cooperate with others, and responsibility for soldiers,” etc. Traditional military qualities will usually accentuate personal characteristics such as bravery, honor, charisma, and tradition. Danish officers, however, seldom mentioned these values. Here is a contradiction: Danish senior officers define “military leadership” by civilian values, but include military values when they define themselves as professional soldiers. Of course, military leadership is a complex concept. But it is even more so in complex alleviation actions and in PSOs. Here, we mostly find “ad hoc leadership” where the specific “military” elements of leadership are strongly reduced. This perception is confirmed when one reviews the Danish Manual for all soldiers, in which only two pages (of the more than seventy pages devoted to “military leadership”) are used to explain military leadership, while the major part of the chapter deals with leadership in general. The reason for this is that “. . . no major differences seem in principle to exist between the social-psychological and group dynamic factors in the civil and the military organization.” In short, the value of military leadership in Denmark is team oriented, accepts the involvement and participation of the individual soldier in defining the intended goal, allowing him to influence how to accomplish it, and letting him have a say when the success of the task has to be evaluated. Next, the expansion of the personnel ethics at the cost of moral and law is shown in the answers of Danish senior officers when asked: “Which are the qualities of Danish soldiers (contracted and enlisted personnel)?” The answers can be structured along four reasons here with some arguments attached: - Result-orientation: “Danish soldiers feel responsible for the accomplishment of a task.” - Social behavior: “Danish soldiers perceive themselves as human beings,” “I know that my soldiers may question my orders, so I have to anticipate the potential reactions and questions of my subordinates and thereby improve my order,” and “Danish soldiers act in a socially responsible manner, taking into account the situation of others.” - Social/educational background: “Danish soldiers are rather well-educated from elementary school,” and “Due to conscription, we still get soldiers with a good social background.” Decentralized military structure: “There are only a few steps from the soldier on the ground and to his Commander (LTC/COL),” and “Easy for any soldier to get in touch with his superior.” This Danish corporate culture is quite different from that of the US Army. Partly, because “obey orders,” “always refer to to laws and military regulations,” , etc. are not defined as the qualities of Danish regulars. Partly, because the distance between soldiers - superior is much more pronounced in the US than in the Danish Army. Actually, I was surprised by the open and critical remarks that young officers made to their senior and higher ranking colleagues during debriefing meetings, where issues such as still lacking fire extinguishing equipment in Bosnia, problems with budgeting systems, etc. were placed on the agenda by the younger officers, with the expectation that the responsible senior officers would respond to their needs and requests. This culture of close relations is taught and established in a number of ways. All Danish army officers are educated together, across regiments and branches (infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc) at least twice, at the Military Academy and at the Staff Officer course (VUT I), before they meet for the third time at the General Staff course (VUT II). While the first time a US Army officer will meet functionally with colleagues from other branches is at the General Staff course, Danish officers are asked to work across branch lines. They know each other’s function and the corporate culture within each of the services and branches, even if differences in culture for the three Danish services are found. There are other differences between US and Danish/European army organizations with respect to manning a staff, using specialists, and promoting a career. As said earlier, the MND(N) staff was dominated by US Army soldiers, who made up 98% of the organization, while in the two other European divisions, a more equal representation was found. In the US Army, specialists are used more often than in Europe, where a commissioned officer is normally is a generalist. One problem with using specialists up to the level of LTC is that, when they deliver information, they unintentionally interpret this information in a narrow “specialist”way. Often, a generalist can better analyze a situation and suggest the best course of action. Because the US system, up to the rank of LTC, is generally run by specialist officers, less senior officers often fail to take a broad enough perspective when recommending changes or courses of action. This awkward situation is reinforced by the US military career system, described by Danish senior officers as an “up-or-out” system. This means that an officer’s performance in his present position is the basis for his evaluation, and for his potential for promotion. One bad remark on the record of an officer can stop his career. Therefore, he is more vulnerable to criticism than a Danish officer, whose total career pattern, from Military Academy via Staff /General Staff courses to his present position, is taken into consideration. 3.1.2 Command and Control A major reason for tension is different rules of command and control. Directly, the US Army uses its own standards in Bosnia, while all other Western nations adapt to the “NATO Major Command: “Doctrines for Peace Support Operations.” An example: A division never issues “orders; rather, it gives “directives” to its brigades. This normal procedure between Divisions and Brigades is violated by the US Army officers giving orders to the NORD POL BDE. The different command and control model is reflected in the question to Danish senior officers: “An incident with a local woman and her child caught in a car in a crossfire situation between local soldiers. Describe the reaction of soldiers from Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, UK, and the USA” with four options: “Interfere,” “Call for help,” “Call for instructions,” and “Ignore.” The answers indicate a declined activity for the platoon from “interfere” to “ignore.” The difference between “call for help” and “call for instruction” is that in the first case the platoon has already defined the situation as one where back-up is needed, while soldiers in the latter situation expect their superiors to do so. It was understood that the platoon had no officer to command it. Even though some of the Danish senior officers hesitated before answering, 93% agreed that a Danish platoon will “interfere.” 87% expected soldiers from the UK to do the same, 70% for soldiers from Norway. 63% for soldiers from Finland, and 57% for soldiers from Sweden. It is interesting that 90% of Danish senior officers expected US soldiers to “call for help/instructions”, 67% for Polish soldiers to do so, and 40% for Baltic countries soldiers indicating a strong belief in the lack of initiative among US privates, in particular, and even greater than thet for soldiers from former Warsaw Pact countries. Of course, the different answers illustrate many possible reactions to the same incident due to unforeseeable elements in alleviation missions/PSOs and military experiences. Thus, it is obvious that US Doctrine states that one should never enter a potential conflict without sufficient back-up from superiors; this was a lesson learned from Lebanon in 1982 and Somalia in 1994. Therefore, when the US Army-led MND(N) applies one set of command and control rules and the Nordic battalions another, it is not surprising that tensions can arise. 3.1.3 Befehlstaktik versus Auftragstaktik Another reason for the rules of command and control to create tension is based on different tactical understanding. American soldiers are taught “Befehlstaktik,” Danish soldiers “Auftragstaktik.” Befehlstaktik means that the officer dictates for the soldiers not only what job to do, but prescribes moreover how to do it, which way to go, for how long a time, what tool to use, etc. Auftragstaktik only defines for the soldiers what task must be accomplished. Thereafter, the platoon is expected to know what to do to. The instruction of Danish soldiers in Auftragstaktik increases their sense of responsibility, self-esteem, etc., and make them more engaged in doing their job. This criticism of the American way is not, per se, a rejection of “Befehlstaktik.” It depends on the type of mission. In clear battlefield operations, “Befehlstaktik” might be the better doctrine. But in an IFOR/SFOR type of mission with low risks, high uncertainty and lack of predictability, and broad functionality, “Auftragstaktik” is called for. In short, the problem is simply to relate tactics to tasks. 3.1.4 Area of Responsibility, AOR A third command and control area causing tensions is the different understanding of responsibility. A US soldier, even up to the rank of LTC, has a restricted AOR, which is confined to the specific order. A Danish soldier has an over-all responsibility for the accomplishment, the cost-effectiveness, etc. of any task. One consequence of the US Army principle of limited responsibility is that soldiers are not expected to mentally decline or break down, while “the Danish concept is based on the understanding that stress symptoms are normal reactions to abnormal situations.” Another is that the US Army wastes a lot of time pushing failures around instead of learning from them; in Denmark, this game is called: “Who’s got the monkey?” In turn, it means that officers in the US Army are seldom ready to take even minor risks. 3.1.5 Daily Work Relations But perhaps the most difficult things for Danish senior officers to deal with are daily routines and working frictions. Many examples can be mentioned. First, minor problems in the US Army are often elevated to the level of colonel/general, where in Denmark, such problems would be for the platoon leader to decide. For example, a Danish soldier took a photo of a Serbian T-34 Tank, which was forbidden. This misdemeanor was inflated to the size of a major criminal act and an American general even became involved in deliberations over what to do about this “crime” before the discussions were stopped through Danish intervention. A Danish senior officer, having worked closely with the Americans, describes this upward pressure on the decision-making system as a “push-up-system,” referring to younger women using “push up bras” to make their breasts look bigger. Whatever it looks like, however, there is no doubt that inflation of problems haunts the US Army decision-making process and results in an indecisive military organization, which creates an additional problem for other brigades to deal with, as well. Second, US Army soldiers sometimes seem unwilling to listen and learn from other soldiers. For example, according to a Danish major serving as a United Nations Military Observer (UNMO), “. . .the English and French IFOR staffs were very satisfied with their cooperation with the UNMO-organization, while it was very difficult for these colleagues when briefing the Americans.These UNMO-colleagues and personnel from ECMM have risked their lives to get this information throughout the last three years; some have even died trying to get as many pieces of good information as possible. Third, if, for example, a US soldier wants to go for a pizza, he will need four armored vehicles manned with sixteen armed soldiers (four in each car) to drive to the Pizza tavern. After having reached it, they will descend, with two soldiers in front and two in the back to guard the expedition, while two privates go inside to order the pizza. One reason for this heavy back-up for two US Army soldiers buying a pizza is, of course, force protection, because they are more exposed than a Danish soldier. Another is that no US Army officer will take the responsibility for taking too few precautions, even in a low threat situation, in case any casualty should happen. Behind the different behavior of US and Danish/European soldiers lies a different perception of the importance of force protection. In Bosnia, force protection is a main objective for the US Army, whereas it is just one consideration among others for the European soldiers. Yet another reason is the different perception of the US and the Danish Army of the environment in which they work. The US soldiers behave like warriors in a situation they believe has high risks and where they see combat as normal. Danish soldiers, on the other hand, act like mediators/supervisors in a civil conflict. A fourth area of criticism is the rigid treatment by the US Army officers of their personnel. Many indicators point in this direction. For instance, there were 2 - 3 suicides per month among US privates in the period from January - May 1997; American soldiers told me that they referred to MND (N) named “Task Force Eagle” as “Task Force Evil.” In another example, a US private assigned to the Danish section of NORD POL BDE had arranged for his wife to go to Zagreb to meet him there, but was afterwards forbidden to go there by his American superior. A Danish senior officer circumvented the decision by sending him on a “special assignment” for three days to - Zagreb! In another case, a US general ordered all NORD POL BDE-senior officers for a meeting, but came an hour late. In general, the US Army officers -according to Danish senior officers - start with a very rigid discipline, after which they loosen up. A Danish officer will try to keep the same level of discipline throughout the whole mission period. A fifth area of criticism is the US Army attitude toward Civil-Military Affairs (CIMIC.) CIMIC is a new organization built on the UN idea of establishing cooperation between the UNHCR and NGOs on the one hand and armed forces on the other. CIMIC had been tested elsewhere for two years before being implemented in Bosnia. The US Army downplays the importance of this work, contributing only 36 of the 500 CIMIC soldiers in the whole MND(N) area, and only 2 of the 100 officers in NORD POL BDE. Danish soldiers, on the other hand, believe that CIMIC operations contribute to their force protection; not only because 70% of all information in Bosnia now comes from G5-CIMIC work, and only 30 % from the well-established G5 Intelligence effort, but also because it is hoped that conflicts can be stopped before they break out if soldiers are directly engaged in local affairs. Perhaps the best indicator of tensions is the fact that Denmark had to increase a part time job for a Danish officer at NORD POL BDE communicating with MND(N) to a two-officersjob, one at MND(N) the other at NORD POL BDE in order to filter away the problematic decisions of the MND(N) and/or to influence US Army officers (and sometimes even to change orders) to make them acceptable for the brigades. The examples could go on and on. Each is like a pearl. It makes no pearl necklace, neither the second nor the third, but brought together, one by one, this chain does end up becoming a not so flattering pearl necklace. 3.2 NORD POL BDE Nordic-Polish Brigade (NORD POL BDE) The NORD POL BDE consists of the five battalions from the four Nordic countries and Poland. They were organized according to the NATO G-system of functions, with each nation responsible for a specific area: G1 (Personnel) Sweden, G2 (Intelligence) Norway, G3 (Operation) Denmark, G4 (Logistics), G5 (CIMIC), and G6 (Communication). From January 1996 to July 1997, the NORD POL BDE staff was made up of 63 persons; from July 1997 onwards, 115 people served on this staff. To assist NORD POL BDE with respect to logistics, a Nordic Logistical Support Group (NSG) - responsible for coordinating supplies for the five battalions - was established on top of each nation’s Logistical Support Units (NSE). It was located far away in Pecs, Hungary, due to the NATO logistical principles of storing goods in the closest secure country next to the battlefield, which stands in contrast to the UN logistical principle of deploying resources directly in the area where needed. Within NORD POL BDE, Denmark played a leading role. This stems from a number of factors, including Denmark’s having initiated the NORD POL BDE, having been in charge of the G-3 operation, being responsible (through its headquarters company) for the whole NORD POL BDE Camp, and being an active NATO member, with the expectation of having good relations with the US Army in MND(N). This leading role was reflected in the fact that Denmark provided the first and third brigadier general to lead NORD POL BDE. For the reasons listed below, 27% of all Danish senior officers defined NORD POL BDE as the third most problematic military organization with which they had to work in Bosnia (see Figure 3), saying that “improvements [to this unit] were absolutely necessary to facilitate your work” and that this unit was one which caused them “professional problems.” 3.2.1 Military Values and Organizational Principles It seems fair to say that, in spite of different values in the armed forces of the Nordic countries and Poland, these differences caused no major tensions. The following organizational principles, however, might cause tensions. 1. Deployment period: Poland’s contingents serve twelve months, while Denmark’s serve only six. This means that, to some extent, any new Danish team will have to start all over, even if the debriefing of the returning contingent is effective. 2. Criteria for serving: Norwegian officers volunteer; Danish officers are ordered to serve in Bosnia. 3. Language skills: Some (Polish) officers had less command of the English language than others did. 4. Command procedures: Sweden has a 22 point command system; Denmark and Norway applied the 5 point NATO Standard Procedure. 5. Relationship to NATO: Denmark and Norway, as members of NATO, get more influence/information from the US Army-dominated MND(N) than do Sweden and Finland, and in particular, than Poland. Recruitment background: Norway has more reservist soldiers than any of the other four nations.7. Living conditions: Officers from Sweden and Finland brought their wives with them to Pecs, while Danish officers were forbidden to do the same in the beginning. Norwegian officers were the most highlypaid, got the greatest tax reductions, and the most free trips back home. The Finnish soldiers were very well equipped with PCs, and the Polish ones were the poorest. 3.2.2 Rules of Command and Control Tensions with and within NORD POL BDE caused by different command and control rules are unavoidable for the simple reason that, even though NORD POL BDE may be overstaffed, its competence is more limited than that of a normal brigade. NORD POL BDE has only operational control of its battalions. It can never in reality command its five battalions to exercise. It is constrained to do so only theoretically, with command post exercises. Moreover, the brigade may never order any battalion to transfer any of its troops to another unit; the brigade is only allowed to combine two or more complete battalions. It may not change the composition of any of the units by extracting components of one battalion and placing them into another already existing battalion. In practice, it is then arranged that a whole battalion must be subordinated to another if even a single platoon from one battalion must join another. Some of the Danish officers characterized NORD POL BDE as being “in command of nothing.” Others modified this evaluation and said that if a battalion had problems (with the locals, for example), it could turn to the brigade for assistance (from other battalions, for instance); under these circumstances, the battalions liked working with the NORD POL BDE. 3.2.2 Daily Work Relations Tensions stemming from daily work relations were mutual. Sweden and Finland tend to give extremely detailed orders (i.e., micro management), and Sweden has more regulations than any of the other four countries. Sweden supplied the Swedish NGO “Verket” with vehicles, unheard of in the other battalions. Norway’s main directive toward locals was: “Stay out.” Denmark’s: “Act fast.” According to some Danish senior officers, half the NORD POL BDE did not work and the other half was ineffective due to lack of means and competence. One illustration of this is that the Nordic battalions worked together instead of, as a normal procedure, contacting the NORD POL BDE to take the initiative in leading cooperation between the battalions. Economics, of course, will always cause frictions. In general, the two NATO nations, Denmark and Norway, held the most discussions; Sweden and Finland had fewer, and Poland had the least. Denmark was criticized for her unwillingness to pay for fire extinguisher materials as it was responsible for headquarters company, but Denmark argued that the NORD POL BDE camp expenses were mutual, and, for that reason, expenses for fire-fighting material should also be mutual. Norway, on the other hand, in the first half of 1997, tried to have the other participants in NORD POL BDE pay for the transfer of its NSE unit from Pecs to Modrica. 3.3 Danish Military Organizations Abroad and at Home DANBN is, as shown in Figure 1 , the second most contacted military authority, according to 77% of all Danish senior officers, with HOK as the third most contacted authority, with 40%. But when it comes to problematic military authorities, the Danske Livregiment, DLR, is a clear number two or three, competing with Regional/Local authorities for that position. One may wonder how a Danish military organization providing logistical support to DANBN and NORD POL BDE received such a poor rating, where 27% found “improvements of DLR absolutely necessary to facilitate Danish senior officers’ work" and 37% identified DLR as “the military authority with which you have had professional problems.” One explanation is that the accusations against DLR are unjust. Others argue, in contrast, that there are more problems with DLR values: • Lack of engagement organization: Too few and too many unqualified persons work in DLR and no one is a logistics specialist. Actually, DLR is just an office for a specific regiment. • Rules of command and control: DLR is only the messenger trying to get material from Hærens • Materiel Kommando (HMAK), which is the agency responsible for material, and Daily work relations: DLR feels that working hours are from 08:00 in the morning to 16:00 in the afternoon, while DANBN and NORD POL BDE work 24 hours a day. Whatever the reason, DLR has given deployed Danish officers problems, so its services have now been brought to an end with the establishment of a new international Army center for logistics. 3.3.1 DANBN - Baltic Cooperation The composition of Baltic units in DANBN has shifted over time. In the first two IFOR/SFOR missions, from February 1996 to February 1997, the three Baltic countries deployed a joint unit of 100 soldiers, with each country’s contingent of approximately 30 soldiers headed by 1 platoon leader from that country . From February 1997 onwards the individual Baltic countries, in turn, deployed 1 company of 100 soldiers headed by a major. The reason for the new arrangement was that a company headed by a major is more operational than three minor units with only a platoon leader in command. Of course, under this new rotational system of single-country units, mutual cooperation among Baltic soldiers was put aside. The Danish senior officers were asked to “evaluate the Danish-Baltic military cooperation” with respect to “Cultural differences,” “Treatment of soldiers,” “Tensions between Danish - Baltic soldiers,” “Achievements,” and “Improvement.” Military Values and Organizational Principles Different “cultural” values did cause some tensions, in particular in the beginning. These “values” are a Baltic over-consumption of food and alcohol compared with that of Danish soldiers. But the basic difference is the relationship between a private and his NCOs/officers. A Danish officer expects his soldiers to tell him if something is wrong. A Baltic soldier would never dare to do so. He is used to a robot-like discipline. Besides, Baltic soldiers are very unfamiliar with the Danish “Talsmandssystem” (job steward system). It will take Denmark a lot of effort over a long period of time to improve this situation. In an actual conflict in Viborg between a Baltic officer and his soldiers, a whole weekend (normally spent enjoying recreation) was used to discuss such a conflict, have it understood, and dealt with. It was quite a new experience for Baltic soldiers to go through this process of conflict-management. Rules of Command and Control The rules of command and control create no problems, as the Baltic military units join the Danish Battalion to learn NATO standard procedures. The same goes for the education of Baltic soldiers. It begins in Viborg, Denmark, where each Baltic company is given a 6-10 week preparation course before deployment to one of the two Danish camps in Bosnia. This training goes on during their stay, where they live and work with Danish soldiers. This education ends (for their officers) with Staff Officers/General Staff courses at the multinational Baltic Defense College, established to serve all three Baltic nations, headed by a Danish brigadier general, and with a staff of instructors from 12 nations. Daily Work Relations According to Danish senior officers Baltic soldiers are hardworking, robust, and experienced (have been deployed 3 - 4 times), but they lack initiative, English language skills (but they speak Russian and they therefore serve as shadow-interpreters when DANBN soldiers communicate with the Serbs), and openness. They do as they are told, but have no tradition of telling about problems, for instance if they don’t understand an order or if something is broken. Therefore they are neither given the poorest nor the best jobs. What is in this for Denmark? We are convinced that we are doing the right thing: teaching Baltic soldiers about our North-European military leadership style and NATO procedures thereby improves their chances for membership in NATO by planting our culture throughout their military educational system. But we learn a lot at the same time. In particular, we can see how poorly Danish officers once treated their own soldiers. To conclude, Danish senior officers relationships with other military contingents showed no doubt that MND(N), headed by the US Army, was the most criticized external organization; 47% of our senior officers said “improvements were absolutely necessary to facilitate their work in Bosnia” while another 40% referred to having “had professional problems” with the MND(N). The second most problematic military organization was the DLR, with respectively 27% and 37% of senior officers registering concerns with this unit. Finally, the NORD POL BDE came in as third most problematic, with 27% of senior officers answering in the affirmative to both questions. In contrast, DANBN, other battalions, and Danish national military institutions such as MoD, DC, HOK, met only minor criticism. It is important to note that criticism of the US Army, in particular, was aimed at its senior officers, not its regulars, and that this criticism was not only described, it was explained as well, focusing on all three aspects: US Army values and organizational principles, rules of command and control, and daily work behavior. However, the bottom line is that criticism should neither be excused nor silenced, but rather constructively dealt with in order to diminish tensions and improve cooperation between the many military contingents committed to fight for the same good cause. 4. Military to International Political and Humanitarian Organizations (NGOs) The contact between Danish senior officers and international political authorities (PIC, OSCE, OHR, UNHCR, UNMIB, humanitarian agencies and NGOs is, as shown in table 2 , rather modest. Table 2 in about here Table 2 shows no tensions between Danish senior officers and international/governmental political authorities. Nevertheless, 27% of Danish officers mentioned NGOs/PVOs as problematic organizations, saying “improvements were absolutely necessary to facilitate their work in Bosnia.” Danish senior officers argued that NGOs often withhold information on where, when, and how to work, partly because they did not want to share information with other NGO agencies for competitive reasons, partly because they did not want to coordinate with the Danish armed forces for the aid they supplied. But the problem to the Danish armed forces was that in case of an emergency they could not rescue the NGO representatives. To conclude, international political organizations caused no tensions and the NGOs only did so because the Danish officers felt responsible for their lives and wanted to coordinate their aid work with that of the NGOs. 5. Military to Regional/Local authorities and Population 5.1.Regional/Local Authorities The regional/local authorities represent a broad segment of the local power elite in Bosnia, i.e., both military officers and civilian mayors, local police force, etc., within all three ethnic groups. Danish officers in charge of negotiations with the local representatives describe those talks as peaceful, but delicate. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 6 above, 33% of Danish senior officers mentioned that “improvements [in dealing with local authorities] were absolutely necessary to facilitate their work in Bosnia;” 27% had “professional problems” with both Republika Srpska and Federation authorities. So, there is no doubt that local authorities created tensions for Danish senior officers. But such tensions were expected and they disappeared after some time. The local authorities are a kind of counter-parts for the Danish senior officers in the negotiations on how to disarm and create peace in Bosnia. Therefore, the real question is not whether the local authorities caused tensions but how Danish senior officers coped with them. Actually, most Danish senior officers argued that they were on a good footing with all sides and that they tried to remain so for a number of reasons. First, DANBN was located in both sectors; accordingly, its officers could play a more impartial a role by balancing their time, aid, and control over the population equally. Second, they urged the three ethnic group to sit around the same table and negotiate. For instance, in the beginning, when the Danish battalion chief asked Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian military commanders for a meeting, the local authorities did not even communicate with one another – their communications were only with the Danish officers. After more meetings, however, conversations between all three ethnic groups emerged. Third, Danish senior officers are familiar with negotiations, both with local Danish mayors, other county/municipal politicians, trade union representatives, and other civilian officials. Fourth, Danish senior officers strove not to act in “too military” a manner. Of course, they were not equal partners because the Danes could always order the local authorities to do as they wanted. From time to time, though, Danish senior officers had to demonstrate their military muscles, for example, during the disarmament of the Serbian special police force, and when the Danes had to control 1,500 Serbs and 500 Muslims who stood against one another in hostile gatherings on each bank of the Sava river. Danish senior officers always tried to use as little military power as possible, in contrast to the US Army officers who, during the same actions, employed all their heavy gear. In short, the explanation for the rather low and few tensions between Danish senior officers and local authorities is that the former are used to dealing with local authorities using as little military might as possible. 5.2 Local Population In contrast to the tensions between Danish senior officers and local authorities, no tensions were found between the former and the local population. (See Figure 2 above) On the other hand, the most “often reported” type of incidents were “problems with local population” (50%) and “problems with local civil and military authorities” (43%). Therefore, according to Danish senior officers, the locals create problems, but not tensions. One explanation is - as said - the Danish soldiers’ impartiality toward the local population. This was tested when asking the Danish senior officers: “What is your general attitude toward the local population in your mission area?” Officers were given three possible options: “Positive,” “Neutral,” or “Negative” for each of the three ethnic groups: “Croats,” “Serbs,” and “Muslims.” 57% of all Danish senior officers had the same (either positive, neutral, or negative) attitude toward all three groups, and the number of officers with negative attitudes toward Croats and Muslims were outbalanced by the same number having positive attitudes. Thisopinion balance was a little more negative toward the Serbs, as only one Danish officer sided with the Serbs and six opposed them. All Danish senior officers were aware, however, that almost all aid (95% from the Western world) went to the Federation (Croats and Muslims), and only 5% went to the Serbs. In Bosnia, the IGVA catalogue counts some 250 NGOs, of which only 18 are supporting the Serbs. Therefore, Danish soldiers deliberately tried to balance this biased distribution by supplying the Serbian sector with clothes, food rations, etc., in particular because the federal populations declined the simple aid as they did not need it. For instance, an old but still functional dental clinic from the Danish armed forces was given to the Serbian Doboj hospital. The positive evaluation of the Danish PSO effort in the IFOR/SFOR mission shown in this report, which was based on Danish senior officers’ statements, could lead one to the assumption that senior Danish officers strongly believed in what they were doing in Bosnia. This is far from so. When asked: “What is the most essential impact of the presence of the Danish armed forces in Bosnia?" 90% of the Danish senior officers answered: “Military” (i.e., they keep peace.) When asked, however, “In your opinion, what is the solution for peace in Bosnia?” 43% don’t see any solution right now under the Dayton Agreement, while 53% believe that peace is possible, provided that the area receives economic aid, that war criminal trials take place, that educational efforts are undertaken, etc. So, although Danish soldiers are doing a good job in Bosnia, they do so as professionals, not as idealists. 6. Conclusion Per capita, Denmark is in a vanguard PSOposition with regard to PSOs. During the Cold War period, Denmark was only militarily active with UN Military Observer missions around the world. After the end of the Cold War, and due to the shift from collective to selective security, Denmark has increased its military engagement and, more decisively, has moved from a verbal to a violent foreign policy. The reduction of military spending is lower than in most other Western countries. With the new Defense Act of 1999, passive military spending (regiments, garrisons) has been exchanged for active expenses (weapons, sea-/air-lift material) to improve the effectiveness of Danish PSOs, especially, the Danish Reaction Brigade, DIB. Danish officers are professionally motivated (“gain additional military skills”, etc.) and are doing a good job for professional reasons, not as convinced idealists. Tensions were not found within DANBN. In contrast, tensions were, in particular, identified between Danish and US Army according to 47% and 40% of Danish senior officers, between them and DLR with 27% -37%, and between them and the NORD POL BDE with 27% and 27% . Therefore, it seems clear that external military organizations were the main creators of tension. These tensions are reflected in the time consumption of Danish officers, having moved from internal in national military positions to more external in this multinational mission. More of Danish senior officers’ time in Bosnia was used dealing with other military contingents than on local politics, indicating that multinational relations were more important than local contacts. Or, formulated in another way, the new type of combat has not influenced the time consumption of Danish senior officers, even if the risk for soldiers in combat areas is higher than it was in the Cold War period. Tensions between multinational military contingents may have influenced the role perception of Danish senior officers, as well. They define themselves as ambassadors and mediators only after defining themselves as professional soldiers. Due to the tragic consequences for the local populations of their civil war, 53% now include “humanitarian worker” as their fourth most important role. It is problematic that the high-level military authority MND(N) causes tensions for the lower-ranking brigades and battalions. These tensions are caused for a number of reasons, including differences in military values and organizational principles, rules of command and control, and daily work relations. Most tension is probably caused by the latter, where US Army officers demonstrate that they are somewhat out of touch with and do not understand the European perception of military leadership and the importance of CIMIC. “Military to political/humanitarian” relations were rather modest, and no tensions were reported between Danish senior officers and international political organizations such as the UN, OSCE and EU. NGOs caused some tensions, as did local authorities, Republika Srpska and the “Federation,” which was to be expected. Although the relationship between Danish senior officers and the local population was problematic, it was almost without any tensions, which might have to do with the balanced attitude of Danish senior officers toward the three ethnic groups. In short, tensions were neither found at the internal military area within DANBN, nor at the “military-to-international” political level (toward the international political organizations or toward the local population.) Some tensions were identified toward NGOs, the national external military unit DLR, the multinational external military unit NORD POL BDE, and local authorities. Major tensions existed toward the US Army, created by the Americans’ military values, rules of command and control, and in particular, daily work relations. Here, improvements in the behavior of the US Army for the sake of its IFOR/SFOR partners and their mutual cause are called for. Tables Table 1. The Three Most Contacted, in Need for Improvements, and Problematic Military Authorities 1999. In percentages. The three most contacted authorities Improvement in this authority necessary to facilitate your job Problematic authorities MND(N) 30 47 (1) 40 (1) NORD POL BDE 87 (1) 27 (2) 27 (3) DANBN 77 (2) 7 3 HOK 40 (3) 13 7 DLR 3 27 (2) 37 (2) Table 2. The Three Most Contacted, in Need for Improvements, and Problematic Political and Humanitarian Authorities. 1999. In percentages. The three most contacted authorities Improvement in this authority necessary to facilitate your job Problematic authorities PIC, OSCE, UNHCR, OHR 13 7 13 NGOs/PVOs 0 27 (3) 7 Regional/local authorities 10 33 (2) 27 (3) Local population - 3 0 Annotated Literature Please standardize in accordance with “Notes for Contributors.” In particular, please translate titles of articles and/or books and place inside parentheses. Andersen, Claus E., “I krydsild. Den danske bataljon i Kroatien og Bosnien (In Cross Fire. The Danish Battalion in Croatia and Bosnia),” Militært Tidsskrift 1996.3:286. Review of Jensen, Jørn, Chief of the Danish battalion, when two Danish soldiers were killed in crossfire between Serbian and Croatian soldiers in September 1995, when he himself was absent. Andersen, Henrik Elsig , Dansk FN-soldater 2 år efter (Danish UN Soldiers Two Years After), Copenhagen:FCL, 1998. Interviews with 1,082 Danish soldiers deployed in Bosnia in DANBAT. Eight were involved in battle incidents in May, August, and September 1995 in the former Yugoslavia. 16% (or 172) of the veterans had stress reactions influencing their daily lives after their dismissal. The survey disclosed that the soldiers with mental stress, in particular, came from the group having been in battle, shot at, who experienced brutal behavior on the part of the Serbs/Croats, etc. On the other hand, a crucial factor for their continued stress was the way they were received at home by their families after discharge. Andersen, Henrik, “Antallet af hjemvendte med behov for psykologhjælp halveret siden DANBAT (Number of Discharged With the Need for Psychological Help Halved Since DANBAT), 7-8,” in Hærnyt, 3.1998:10–-13. Bache, Marianne and Birgitte Hommelsgaard, Danske FN-soldater. Oplevelser og Stressreaktioner (Danish UN Soldiers. Experiences and Stress Reactions)), Copenhagen 1994. The report concludes that normal Post Traumatic Disorder, PTDS, increases significantly after the first three-month period following discharge. Of 722 conscripts responding to three survey rounds, 514, 471, and 405 reported on their post-deployment stress reactions. 83% have had such reactions within the 6-month period after dismissal, of which 7% were highly stressed. Bache, Marianne, DIB-soldat eller ej?(To Be DIB Soldier or Not ?) , Copenhagen:FCL, March 1998. A study of all 5,451 Danish conscripts in 1995, and their reasons for joining the Danish International Brigade, DIB, for a three-year contract period. Only 7% did so and mostly for “experience” reasons 38%. The study goes on through 2000. Bertelsen, F.H., “Tjeneste i multinational stab under fredsstøttende operationer (Service in Multinational Staff During Peace Support Operations),” Militært Tidsskrift 5.1996:338 - 346. Personal lesson from Bosnia is that language and weaponry are indispensable necessities to handle the situation in Bosnia. Christensen, W.K., “Flyvestyrkers muligheder i Bosnien (The Possibilities of Air Forces in Bosnia),” Militært Tidsskrift 1.1994:59-72. Scenarios in case of a UN air strike against Serbian positions in Bosnia. Clemmesen, Michael H., “De baltiske forsvars nye hjernevugge (The Cradle of the Baltic Defense),” Udenrigs 1.1999:1-8. Clemmesen, Michael H., Værnskulturerne og forsvarspolitikken (The Cultures of the Armed Forces and the Defense Policy), (Århus: Politica, 1986). Fabricius, Bent, “Operation SHARPGUARD - sømilitære erfaringer (Operation SHARPGUARD -Naval Experiences),” Militært Tidsskrift 2.1996:105 ff. Denmark participated with a corvette, NIELS JUEL, in the maritime blockade of Serbia-Montenegro. Vessels unwilling to stop were threatened to be escorted to an Italian harbor for further investigation. They generally quickly decided to cooperate. End of Tour Report 1-6 for Danish IFOR/SFOR mission. Battalion chief and company commanders’ reports after six months of service in Bosnia. Their experiences, proposals, and problems are handed over to the next mission and the military organizations in Denmark serving them down there. (Classified) Forsvarskommandoen, Ledelse og Uddannelse. En grundbog (Management and Education. A Manual), (København, 1998), chapter 4 “Ledelse og organisation, pp. 310-379. Forsvarschefen Informationskontoret, Fact about Denmark. The Armed Forces. 1998, Vedbæk 1998, pamphlet. Forsvarskommissionen, Beretning (Report), Copenhagen 1998. Forsvarsministeriet, Årlig redegørelse (Annual Report), respective years, Copenhagen, March 1998a:12-17. Annual Report of the Danish Defense Ministry. Forsvarsministeriet, Opgørelse over udsendt dansk personel 1992-1997(Account of Deployed Danish Personnel), Copenhagen 1998. A record of Danish soldiers deployed from April 1992 to December 1997. Forsvarsministerens Rådgivnings- og Analysegruppe, RAG, Mulighederne for at opstille en dansk hærenhed af brigadestørrelse til indsættelse i internationale operationer (The Possibilities of Establishment of a Danish Army Unit of the Size of a Brigade for Deployment in International Operations), København 1992. FOV nyhedsbrev.Specialudgave : “Aftale om forsvarets ordning 2000–2004 (Special Issue. Accord of Danish Defense 2000-2004).” 21.1999 of May 26, 1999. A record of what was needed to establish the Danish Reaction Brigade, DIB. Franke, Volker C., Learning Peace: Attitudes of Future Officers Towards the Security Requirements of the Post-Cold Wart World, p. 3, Working paper no. 9, The John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, January 1997. Greve, J., “Iagttagelser fra UNPROFOR (Observations from UNPROFOR),” Militært Tidsskrift 5.1993:127-139. The experiences of one of the first Danish senior officers observing the differences between the UN definition of a peaceful situation and the real one in Bosnia. Hansen, Annika, et al. (eds.), A Research Guide to Implementing Peace, FFI, 1997. Hornhaver, Henrik, “AIRPOWER -et eksempel (AIR POWER - An Example),” Militært Tidsskrift 2.1998:190-199. The operations and the results of DELIBERATION FORCE air strike against Serbian forces in Bosnia in September 1995 are described. HQ Chief of Staff, Facts about Denmark. The Armed Forces, pamphlet, January 1998. Husum, Søren Bo, I krig uden våben (In War Without Arms), Lynge:Bogans forlag, 1995. Describes the inefficiency of UN –forces. Hæren, Kundgørelser, respektive år. (Announcements from the Army, Respective Years) (Classified) HOK (Hærens operative Kommando), HOK.TTJ UDV.096. 240/ORG, Oct 1998. Høegh-Guldberg Hoff, Ove, “Lessons Learned from the IFOR Deployment,” in NATO’s Sixteen Nations. Special Issue. 1997, pp. 82–84. Internet links: www.fov.dk/forsvarslinks, and http://www.SHIRBRIG.dk Jensen, Jørn, “I fredens tjeneste- en bataljonschefs erfaringer (In Service of Peace. Experiences of a Battalion Commander),” Militært Tidsskrift 2.1996), pp. 92-99. Tema: “Erfaringer fra Ex-Jugoslavien(Lessons Learned from the formerYugoslavia).” The article explores the contradiction between the normal impartial, minimum force, lightly-armed UN military units deployed with the consent of both combatants, and the actual position of UN soldiers, who were only placed on the Serbian side and not the Croatian one and who were unable to keep the fighting parties apart and secure peace in protected areas. Especially, the absence of a Status of Forces Agreement, SOFA, allowing UN units the “freedom of movement” is criticized. The Danish soldiers were praised by their battalion chief Jørn Jensen, who, however, finds recruitment and leadership qualities must be improved. Jensen, Jørn, “Ledelse under ekstreme vilkår - ansvarets byrde (Managemnet Under Extreme Conditions - The Burden of Responsibility),” Militært Tidsskrift 2.1998:140-146. Examples of critical or dangerous situations for Danish soldiers and, in particular, the one in Dvor on September 17/18, 1995, where two Danish soldiers were killed due to Croatian artillery attacks on the Danish military contingent, which took place while COL Jørn Jensen was in Denmark for consultations. Johnsen, H.I.Q., “En dansk efterretningsofficers tjeneste ved CAOC Vicenza (A Danish Intelligence Officer´s Service at CAOC Vincenza),” Militært Tidsskrift 2.1996:113-118. A Danish female watch officer describes her work of identifying Serbian military units for the NATO Air Force operations after the Dayton Agreement to supervise the respect for the No-fly-zone in Bosnia and the cooperation of soldiers from several countries in the unit. Lund, J.C., “Chef for G3 PLANS/UNPROFOR (Commander of G3 PLANS/UNPROFOR),” Militært Tidsskrift 2.1996, Tema: “Erfaringer fra Ex-Jugoslavien” (“Lessons from the formerYugoslavia”), pp. 82-91. The work of UNPROFOR and the cooperation of officers from more nations are described and characterized, along with more self-critical evaluations. Humor is seen as a most needed prerequisite. Problems influencing high-ranking officers from great power nations are mentioned. Denies the statement that “Asians cannot work, Southern Europeans won’t, and South Americans are not present,” but criticizes the great power nations for deploying low-quality or even corrupt officers. Madsen, Jørgen P. “Stresspåvirkning under FN-tjeneste (Stress Affects During UN Service) ,” Militært Tidsskrift 1.1995. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Lessons Learned. Martini, Steen, “Peacekeepers Facing Horrors of Civil-like Conflict - Danish Lessons Learned in Preparing and Taking Care of Soldiers” in Wolfgang Biermann & Martin Vadset (eds.), UN in Trouble - Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia,” Sidney: Ashgate, part V, 1998. The author argues that mental breakdowns in extreme situations are normal. Lars R. Møller, “Træfningen i Tuzla (The Engagement in Tuzla),” in Frederik Sternfelt and Nils Gunder Hansen, Kritik 134, Tema: Krig (War), Copenhagen 1999. Describes the lethal tank battle between a Danish squadron and Bosnian Serbs on April 29, 1994. Nielsen H., “Forward air controller n Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Militært Tidsskrift 3.1996:188-192. The procedures of an FAC unit of identifying targets are described. Nielsen, Jørn A., “Fem nationer i samarbejde (Five Nations Cooperating),” Hærnyt 3.1998, p. 9. Rahbek, M., “Etik og moral i forbindelse med FN-tjeneste (Ethics and Morale in Connection with UN Service),” Militært Tidsskrift 1.1994:13-18. Scenarios of moral dilemmas. Regiment leaflets for material on Danish Armed forces in Bosnia from 1992 - Spring 1999: Garderhusaren, Griffen, Slesvigeren, Prinsens, Gyldenløve, Danske Livregiment, Kentaur, Musketten. Henning Sørensen, “Conscription in Scandinavia,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 26, No. 2, Winter2000:313-334. Describes the combined conscription development of reducing/abandonning conscription on the one hand and expanding it (female and homosexual conscripts) on the other. Henning Sørensen, “NATO and Its New Military Security Position,” European Security , Vol. 7, No.,1,,Spring 1998: 75-79. Describes change in world politics from “collective to selective security” Sørensen, Henning, “Professional Identity and Social Image,” pp. 45-52 in Guiseppe Caforio, The European Cadet: Professional Socialization in Military Academies, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), p. 45 ff Sørensen, Hennning and Svendsen, Anders, Civil kontrol med militæret i Danmark, København: ISFs forlag 1995. This report gives specific examples of lack of control of the Danish armed forces. Sørensen, Henning, Den danske officer:Fra Kriger til administrator (The Danish Officer:From Warrior to Administrator), Copenhagen:Nyt fra Samfundsvidenskaberne, 1988. Comparison of Danish soldiers with those of the USA, UK, France, Germany, and Sweden with respect to social background, function, education, and career pattern. UNPROFOR DANBAT 1 – 6.