Reasons for and Solution to Morale Problems as Seen by Officers from 7 Nations

Henning Sørensen, M.Sc. in Political Science (KU), M.Sc. in Public Administration (AU), and Ph.D. in organization (CBS)

Abstract

216 officers from seven nations: Bulgaria, Cameroun, Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Philippines, and Spain were asked their perception of the “unit´s morale” during deployment abroad in asymmetric wars. Half of them saw no morale problems. Major national differences appeared here as only 20 % of Spanish officers reported morale problems whereas 90% of Danish officers did. The other half of 109 officers did mention 160 reasons for a drop in morale related to either War, leadership, or individual problems. The 109 officers’ views are distributed rather equally on the three categories. Nevertheless, a majority of Danish officers (15 out of 17) reported war factors. In contrast, 10 % or less of officers from Spain, Finland, Bulgaria and the Philippines gave the same answer. Over half of the Italian officers saw leadership factors causing morale problems (14 out of 26) while no officer from the Philippines and a few from Spain did so. Almost three out of four officers from the Philippines found that individual problems created morale problems. Only one out of five officers or less from the other nations identified the same cause. Some of the national differences are tentatively explained. Of the 75 solutions suggested, 75% said it was for the military leadership to remedy. The result of the study for the concept of morale and how to handle morale problems in a military unit operating in asymmetric warfare is discussed.

Officer Sample

The number of participating officers, their rank and national background is shown in table 1 below.

Table 1. Profile of the Officer Sample by Nation and Rank. %  

Table 1 shows that 216 officers were interviewed. Most from Bulgaria (56) and fewest from Denmark (21). 59% of the Bulgarian officers come from the upper echelons (Lieutenant Colonel – General), while 81% of the officers from Italy and 72% from Finland and the Philippines come from lower ranks (Lieutenant – Captain). All persons in the sample are officers as warrant officers from Italy, privates from Bulgaria, and one “no-answer” from Spain are excluded.

The officers have served in three different types of asymmetric wars:

• Only in international wars abroad such as in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, and Spain

• Both in international and national wars: 23 Cameroun officers were deployed in this country, while 10 officers had served abroad in Sahara, Nigeria, Sudan, Central African Republic, Congo, and China

• Only in national wars: Officers from the Philippines.

The views of officers come from Q 4c of the questionnaire: “Unit´s morale: Trends during mission, influencing factors, cases of defection, and possible cases of PTSD” and Q 5 “Personal Experiences”. If an officer tells “no problems” but on the other hand describe frustration, cases of defection, etc. the answer is categorized as a morale problem.

Causes of Morale Problems

No Problems

Half of the 216 officers or 107 persons found no morale problems in their unit whereas the other half or 109 officers did. Officers answering “no morale problems” often accompanied their statement with a reason. This reason belongs to one of three main categories: Physical, organizational and the mood factor and by its presence or absence. Table 2 quotes a few of their answers.  

Table 2. Reasons for No Morale Problems

Table 2 shows that the absence of leadership is never mentioned as a reason for “no morale problems”. This result can be related to the important study 70 years ago. Then Shields and Janowitz (1948) found that the combat motivation and group cohesion in the strongly decimated German Wehrmacht were not harmed by the lack of orders and decisions from above. On the contrary, this absence most certainly did help the strong morale of the unit. However, this  officer sample nevertheless sees solution to morale problems delivered by the military organization as presented below in table 8.

National differences exist. Only a minority of Spanish officers (20%) did find “morale problems,” at all. In contrast, 90% of Danish soldiers did so. The few morale problems identified by Spanish officers may be due to their deployment experience. The 26 Spanish officers have accumulated served in 100 military operations abroad. One Spanish officer (E 5) alone have been deployed abroad eight times. No other officer corps can match that level. Therefore, Spanish units seem well integrated and experience only few morale problems.

Problems

Table 3 shows how the 109 officers identified 123 reasons for morale problems related to either

- War: The death of a colleague, fight, enemy, battle fatigue, IED-mines,

         Taliban, Boko Haram, terror, etc.

- Military Leadership: Poor communication, conflicting or disproval of

         decisions, prolonged stay, lack of training, material, food, and

         salaries, dissatisfaction, boredom, tensions in the unit, etc., or

 - The individual soldier: Cases of AWOL, PTSD, critic from soldiers, defections,

          repatriation, psychological challenges, problems in family with wife,

          children, economy, etc.

Table 3. Reasons for Morale Problems by Nation and Type. %  

Table 3 shows a rather equal representation of the three types of causes of around 20%. Danish officers had a tendency to mention more causes (188) than the other officers, Spanish officers less (96). However, table 3 also shows national differences. Relatively more Danish officers (39%) found war factors to cause morale problems in their units than other officers did. Actually, the bulk of Danish officers experiencing morale problems due to war is higher: 17 Danish officers identified morale problems and 4 did not. Of the 17 officers 15 mentioned war factors why the percentage is more correctly 88% or almost 9 out of ten. Italian officers (36%) relatively more often blamed their military organization than other officers did. No Philippian officers said that at all. Instead, 68% of them find the morale problems to arise for individual reasons. At the same time, many Philippian officers understood the situation of their soldiers leading to AWOL.

WAR

Table 4 shows what type of war factors the 41 officers did mention the most of the 49 factors, in total. However, national differences exist for all types.

Table 4. Types of War Factors Causing Morale Problems.

Table 4 tells that Italian and Cameroun officers identified almost all types of war factors as a reason for moral problems. The most selected type causing morale problems was the loss of a colleague, citizens, wounded with 16 views. Danish officers, in particular, did so. The explanation is the high death rate of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan as shown in table 5.

Table 5. Killed Soldiers in Afghanistan by Nation and per mio. Citizens. %  

Table 5 shows that the death rate for Danish soldiers in Afghanistan per one mio. citizens is at least seven times higher than that of the other four nations. Only the US with a death rate of 7,4 and the UK of 6,9 reach this level for their killed soldiers in Afghanistan. Another factor for morale problems seen by Danish officers is probably the concentrated period in which Danish soldiers died. 81% (35 of the 43) perished within four years, 2007-2010, 87 % of the British soldiers (394 of 455) within a six year period 2007-2012, and 82 % of the US soldiers (1,943 of 2,381) in a seven years period 2007–2013. It seems as if Taleban pursued a strategy killing as fast as possible soldiers from the weaker nation first, Denmark, then from the UK and finally from the US. For the Danish soldiers, the IED, snippers, etc. was the most lethal factor. They killed 35 of the 43 Danish soldiers that perished in Afghanistan. A third factor that may have caused morale problems is the “combined strategy” of Danish politicians for soldiers to patrol “light” in order to get faster and more immediate contact with the local population in Gereshk in the Helmand province of Afghanistan. In spite of the fact that the Danish Battalion commander in Afghanistan as early as in 2007 requested heavy vehicles for the protection of his patrolling soldiers such as tanks (Weekendavisen 2017). The Department of States and the DOD, actually the Danish politicians, ignored his request. Thus, Danish officers had more challenges in keeping up morale in their units on this background. 

Leadership

The officers gave 52 views of how organizational factors caused morale problems. 27 were attached to the organization itself, 20 to the mood or the psychological climate in the unit for which the organization still is responsible, and only 5 to physical factors. Table 6 shows that the main sources for a drop in morale is hierarchy/work intensity and time. In other words. It is for the military organization to solve.

Table 6. Types of Organizational Factors Causing Morale Problems

Table 6 shows that absence of physical factors such as food, material, salaries and the presences of organizational factors such as hierarchy, unfair orders together with time at the end of the mission caused morale problems.

Table 6 also shows that in spite of the heavy casualties in the Danish camps, some Danish soldiers wanted “more combat”.

Table 7 shows the distribution of leadership factors causing morale problems by nation and type. The two most important factors – however contradictory – are boredom and work intensity. However, they are both for the military organization to handle as discussed below in “How to Handle Morale Problems in Asymmetric Warfare?”

Table 7. Types of Leadership Factors Causing Morale Problems.

Table 7 reveals that officers from Italy and Denmark, in particular, find the organization to blame. Officers from the Philippines and Spain have none or just two views while officers from Cameroun, Bulgaria and Finland deliver between with 6 to 9 views.

Individual factors

59 views on individual factors causing morale problems are registered, cfr. table 3 above. In particular, officers from the Philippines with 21 views and from Bulgaria with 16 views shared that opinion. Only between 2 to eight views are registered from the other five nations. It reduces the need for further examination.

Solutions of Morale Problems

Instead, it is adequate to see what solutions to the many morale problems the officers have suggested. It is evident that the military organization is seen as the main (f)actor both to cause and solve morale problems as 56 of the 75 solutions (75%) refer to the organization. Only four views are related to war factors and 15 views to individual factors, cfr. table 8. 

Table 8. Solutions to Morale Problems by Nation. %  

Table 8 displays mayor national differences in the number and types of solutions suggested. Italian officers together with officers from Finland and Denmark address this issue, in particular, the least do officers from the Philippines, Cameroun and Bulgaria.

Table 9 below shows the types of organization solutions mentioned.

Table 9. Types of Organization Solutions to Morale Problems.

Table 9 illustrates that officers from two nations have delivered no solutions, at all, i.e. Cameroun and the Philippines, whereas officers from Italy and Finland, in particular, have. Almost half of all solutions are for the commander himself/herself to activate, as he/she – in the end – is responsible for the morale of the unit. On second place is communication, talks, briefings, defusing, “discussion circles”, etc. 

Consequences for the Concept of Morale

The concept of morale presupposes values of what is good and right and they define for us how to act accordingly. Morale among soldiers in military units exists a priori. The nation that decided their deployments abroad has equipped them with a morale/legitimacy to kill. Thus, many morale challenges are removed for the soldiers. Still, a dangerous work situation can be so stressful and do cause morale problems for any man. It can lead to defections, PTSD, AWOL, frustration, etc. So can unfair/unjust orders or family problems. Thus, morale goes from being a cause for cohesion and consensus in the unit to a factor vulnerable to the external factors stressing the work situation.     

In this study, officers should evaluate the morale of their unit´s soldiers and, at the end of the day, their ability to get or improve morale. Therefore, for officers no morale problems are a win/win situation. They have commanded their soldiers well and demonstrated their capacity as a good officer. For soldiers, no morale problems means that they agree personally with the given orders or either adjust to the situation guided by self-control or by fear of sanctions, i.e. discipline, the external control exercised by the officer. Morale problems appear when neither personal accept, self-control or discipline works. Many Bulgarian officers use the formulation “no morale problems with high morale and discipline”. Thus, “morale and discipline” are the same. Others may argue that the “high morale” is present, a priori, and morale obtained positively, where “discipline” is a tool to get morale and is negatively obtained.

No matter how best to define morale, the results of this study reveals that morale is seen both as a cause for no problems and a vulnerable value element affected by external factors such as war, organization or individual issues. Even if some of the morale problems are most understandable due to the dangerous work situation, many more is on the level of normally organizational challenges. Perhaps, the most decisive result is the fact that the military leadership, at the same time, is most aware of its responsibility for causing morale problems, cfr. table 7 and, for solving them, cfr. table 9. Accordingly, it seems as if the burden of no morale problems has shifted from individual to organizational responsibility. It does not exclude war factor from affecting morale, cfr. the answers from Danish officers or individual factor from the same, cfr. officers from the Philippines. Here, it is harder for the military officer to cope with the situation. However, their action and attitude can help a lot. In addition, some guidelines – based on their own views - on how to do so are listed below. 

How to Handle Morale Problems in Asymmetric Warfare

Three types of guidelines are:

- First, the military man as an officer, a staff, a company commander etc. shall serve as an example. Not by words, but by action and attitude. He/she shall define him-/herself as a person rather than a superior. The morale concept now means that the officers must convince his soldiers of the goal of the mission, while he/she still has the right to choose the tools most adequate.

- Second and to some extent, in contrast to the above said, the officers´ right to define tools, orders and decisions shall also be judge by their effect on morale. We know that stress at the work place can cause symptoms of illness or even sickness. This risk will diminish if the employees have influence on their work situation. Therefore, soldiers can bear more stress if they have increased influence on their situation. Officers shall understand that if they increase soldiers´ self-control, it can compensate for a more stress full work situation.

- Third, the military communication can be improved, in general. Officers shall teach to listen, tell, inform, and convince much more than before. In the Cold War period of collective security, many nations in Western Europe saw their existence at stake and therefore took the morale of soldiers for given. Today, we experience selective security, where each nation decide for herself in what conflict or war to engage as no national security issue is at stake for the nations here studied except the Philippines. It means that the political decisions of deployments abroad are well considered and argued for and that those arguments trickle down the military hierarchy to the individual soldier, even if he/she is a volunteer on a contract for a limited period.

However, it presupposes that no officer has any problem of explaining the political strategy. Thus, it is a morale problem when a Danish officer – as quoted in table 6 - asks: “What is the strategy of the whole mission”? And it may cause morale problems when the lethal Danish “combined strategy” has to be pursued sacrificing too many soldiers. Therefore, all soldiers in asymmetric warfare are entitled to ask such questions and entitled to a morale answer. On the bottom line: Military tactics in asymmetric warfare is too important for politicians to decide.

Conclusion

The study chartered officers’ views on their soldiers´ morale and reasons for morale problems. Half of the 216 officers had no morale problems, the other half did. Three types of causes were identified and national differences revealed. The mutual national experiences in the asymmetric wars could explain why officers are so openly aware of their importance of causing and solving morale problems in the military unit. That is probably the most positive fact to conclude from this study.

Breviations

AWOL, Absent Without Official Leave

IED, Improvised Explosive Devices, in contrast to landmines, i.e. Manufactured devices

References

Shield, E. A. & Janowitz, M. Cohesion and Disintegration of the Wehrmacht in World War II”, Public Opinion Quarterly, 1948, 12: 280-315

Weekendavisen, December 8-15, 2017, Henning Sørensen: “Samtænkningens fatale konsekvenser” (“The Fatal Consequences of the Combined Strategy”), p. 15)